

Message Text

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TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 000587 TOSEC 250142

NODIS

FOLLOWING ABIDJAN 0014 SENT ACTION SECSTATE JAN 2; REPEATED
TO YOU QUOTE

S E C R E T ABIDJAN 0014

NODIS

DEPT PASS SECRETARY

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PROF AO US IV

SUB: ANGOLA: SCHAUFLE'S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT
HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY

REF: ABIDJAN 10862

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFLE ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR
HELD TWO HOUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FELIX HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY
AFTERNOON OF JAN 1. THIS FOLLOWED CONVERSATION EARLY
MORNING OF 45 MINUTES WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ARSENE USHER
ASSOUAN ON SAME TOPIC.

2. SCHAUFLE FOLLOWED TALKING POINTS ON US POSITION,
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CONFIRMING THAT USG IS DETERMINED TO REMAIN INVOLVED TO

PREVENT SOVIETS AND CUBANS FROM IMPOSING MPLA GOVERNMENT BY MILIAARY MEANS. IN VIEW OF HOUPHOUET'S KNOWN VIEWS HE EMPHASIZED NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING SITUATION ON THE GROUND AND US GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES

3. HOUPHOUET EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR SCHAUFEELE'S VISIT AND FOR WHAT HE HAD SAID CONFIRMING US POSITION. HE HOPED THAT SHCAUFELE WOULD CONVEY HIS VIEWS BACK TO SECRETARY KISSINGER WHOM HE HAD NOT HAD OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH AT LENGTH DURING HIS STATE VISIST IN OCTOBER 1973, SINCE KISSINGER WAS AT THAT TIME TOO OCCUPIED WITH MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEMS. HE ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT WHILE IVORY COAST IS VERY CLOSE TO FRANCE'S CULTURE AND ECONOMY, ITS FOREIGN POLICY IS CLOSER TO US. HE CITED HIS POSITIONS ON REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND KOREA, BOTH OF WHICH ARE DIFFERENT FROM FRANCE'S POSITION. HE REITERATED WHAT WAS ALREADY COVERED IN HIS DECEMBER 20 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR (REFTEL). HOUPHOUET SAID TI WAS IMPORTANT TO LOOK BEYOUND ANGOLA TO FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET ROLE AND AS WELL AS TO HISTORICAL EVENTS WHICH HAD LET UP TO IT. HE SEES IN ANGOLA SITUATION DANGERS FOR AFRICA AND FOR WORLD POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM. JUST BECAUSE SOVIETS HAVE FAILED IN PAST TO INSTALL THEMSELVES IN AFRICA, MANY PEOPLE THINK THEY NEVER WILL SUCCEED. HOUPHOUET BELIEVES SOVIETS TAKE A LONG VIEW OF HISTORY, FIX PRECISE OBJECTIVES AND STICK TO THOSE OBJECTIVES. BY CONTRAST, US HAS SHOWN ITS DETERMINATION IN FACE OF REAL DANGER (CUBA 1962) BUT ALL TO OFTEN IT THEN RELAXES, WEST BECOMES DIVIDED AND SOVIETS TAKE ADVANTAGE OF RELAXATION AND DIVISIONS.

4. HOUPHOUET REPEATED SOME OF HISTORY FROM REFTTEL ABOUT THE FAILURE OF THE US AND THE WEST TO ACT FAST ENOUGH IN SPAIN (1936), OVER ASWAN DAM AND IN VIETNAM IN 1954. HE IS AFRAID OF COMMUNISM BASED ON HIS OWN EXPERINECE WITH IT.

5. TURNING TO ANGOLAN SITUATION, HOUPHOUET NOTED THAT, EXCEPT FOR GUINEA, ALGERIA AND TANZANIA, ALL BACKERS OF MPLA ARE MILITARY LEADERS AND LACK VISION TO SEE WHILE PROBLEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS. HE FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO "EDUCATE" MANY OF THESE YOUNG AFRICAN MILITARY LEADERS

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AND, JUST AS HE CONVINCES THEM, SOME NEW PROBLEM ARISES. HOUPHOUET HAS TALKED TO HEADS OF ALL THREE ANGOLAN MOVEMENTS. HE IS STRUCK THAT MPLA DOES NOT EVEN KNOWN IT IS BEING RUN BY THE COMMUNIST. IN BEGINNING, MPLA MIGHT HAVE BEEN GROUP TO LEAD ANGOLA, BUT SINCE SOVIETS AND CUBANS HAVE COME IN, THAT IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE EXCEPT BY FORCE. HOWEVER, HE DOES NOT CONSIDER MPLA LEADERS THEMSELVES COMMUNISTS.

6. WESTERN AND PARTICULARLY US, SUPPORT FOR FNLA AND UNITA IS VERY IMPORTANT. THESE GROUPS NEED SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS TO MEET THOSE SOVIETS ARE PROVIDING TO MPLA AND ALSO REQUIRE TECHNICIANS TO MAN THESE WEAPONS. THIS CANNOT BE DONE BY SOUTH AFRICA ALONE BECAUSE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICA IS BEING USED AS RATIONALIZATION BY MANY BLACK AFRICANS TO RECOGNIZE MPLA.

7. HOUPHOUET IS CONFIDENT THAT ZAIRE, ZAMBIA AND FNLA, ALONG WITH SOME OTHER COUNTRIES, WANT SOUTH AFRICA TO REMAIN INVOLVED IN ANGOLA BECAUSE THEY NEED SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY STRENGTH.

8 HE IS AFRAID THAT IF WE WITHDRAW FROM ANGOLA MOBUTU CANNOT SURVIVE AND OTHER COUNTRIES WILL FALL TO COMMUNISTS THEREAFTER.

9. AS HE HAS STATED MANY TIMES IN PAST, HOUPHOUET SAID HIS POLICY OF DIALOGUE HAS ALWAYS BEEN INTENDED AS A WAY OF ACHIEVING GREAT POWER INTERVENTION. SITUATION IN ANGOLA TODAY IS PROOF OF WHAT CAN HAPPEN WHEN DIALOGUE FAILS.

10. TURING TO FORTHCOMING OAU MEETING, HOUPHOUET IS STILL HOPEFUL FOR SOLID SUPPORT FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION FROM MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES, BUT THE PRESSURE WILL BE ON THEM FROM THOSE WHICH HAVE ALREADY RECOGNIZED MPLA. HOUPHOUET MADE CLEAR THAT IVORY COAST WILL HOLD THE LINE AT OAU MEETING. HE IS ASKING TOLBERT OF LIBERIA AND KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO TO DO LIKEWISE. BEFORE US SENATE VOTED AGAINST FUTURE AID IN ANGOLA, HOUPHOUET FELT CONFIDENT OAU MAJORITY WOULD NOT VOTE TO RECOGNIZE MPLA. NOW HE IS NOT SURE. IN RESPONSE TO COMMENTS FROM SCHAUFEL, HOUPHOUET INDICATED HE THOUGHT
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UPPER VOLTA, NIGER AND TOGO WOULD HOLD OUT, AS WOULD NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES, EXCEPT ALGERIA. HE HAS LITTLE HOPE FOR ETHIOPIA. HE ASKED THAT WE HAVE LIBERIA WORK ON SIERRA LEONE AND GAMBIA. SCHAUFEL INFORMED HIM THAT SIERRA LEONE IS REPORTED STANDING FIRM. HE ASKED SCHAUFEL TO ASK SENGHOR OF SENEGAL TO HELP WITH GAMBIA. HOUPHOUET ADDED THAT HE HAD ASKED GOBON TO WORK ON CHAD. SCHAUFEL SAID GABON ALSO WAS WORKING ON MAURITANIA. HOUPHOUET HOPES MOROCCO WILL MAURITANIA IN LINE.

1. SCHAUFEL STATED THAT A NUMBER OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAD RECOGNIZED MPLA WERE STILL ANXIOUS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. HE MENTIONED SUDAN, TANZANIA, GHANA AND NIGERIA. SCHAUFEL ALSO SAID HE WAS IMPRESSED BY THE CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION PRESIDENT AHIDJO OF CAMEROON

TOOK WITH HIM.

12. SCHAUFLE ASKED WHETHER HOUPOUET THOUGHT "AFRICAN NATIONALISM" COULD SOLVE THE PROBLEMS IN ANGOLA. HOUPOUET REPLIED THAT SUCH IS POSSIBLE WHEN THERE ARE NO STRONG OUTSIDE INTERVENTION BUT IN CASE OF ANGOLA TODAY, OUTSIDE INTERVENTION OF COMMUNISTS MAKES AN AFRICAN NATIONALIST SOLUTION IMPOSSIBLE. HOUPOUET REITERATED HIS CONCERN THAT US CONINUE TO MAKE CLEAR ITS DETERMINATION TO OFFSET SOVIET ROLE.

13. IN CONCLUSION, HOUPOUET EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR SCHAUFLE'S VISIT AND FOR REASSURENANCES HE HAD BEEN GIVEN OF US INTENTIONS. HE PROMISED TO DO HIS BEST TO HOLD THE LINE IN OAU WHERE HE WILL BE REPRESENTED BY FOREIGN MINISTER USHER.

14. MORNING DISCUSSIONS WITH USHER COVERED MUCH OF SAME GROUND. ONLY OTHER POINT TOUCHED UPON WAS POSSIBILITY RAISED BY OTHERS (BONGO, AHIDJO) OF TURNING TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL IF THE OAU IS UNABLE TO COME UP WITH A SOLUTION. USHER REPLIED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR UNSC TO BE SEIZED WITH PROBLEM, REFER IT BACK TO OAU AND CALL UPON OAU TO REPORT BACK TO UNSC AS TO THREAT TO PEACE FROM FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA. USHER CITED PRECEDENT OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND OAS.

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15. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFLE SAID BOTH TO PRESIDENT HOUPOUET AND FOREIGN MINISTER USHER THAT HE HOPED FOR A MORE NORMAL VISIT IN IVORY COAST SOON. HE WAS ASSURED HE WOULD BE MOST WELCOMED.

16. USHER INVITED ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFLE AND AMBASSADOR TO LUNCH ON JAN 2 FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS.

17. COMMENT: AT THIS POINT GOIC CAN BE DEPENDED UPON TO BE STANCH SUPPORTER. "I WILL BE THE LAST TO RECOGNIZE THE MPLA". THIS MUST BE TRANSLATED INTO ORGANIZATIONAL AND COORDINATED ACTIVITY WHICH I WILL EMPHASIZE TOMORROW WITH FOREIGN MINISTER USHER, WHO IS EXPERIENCED DIPLOMATIC PARLIAMENTARIAN.

18. FROM MY TALKS WITH US AMBASSADORS AND CHARGES HERE, I CONCLUDE TOGO, UPPER VOLTA, LIBERIAN AND NIGER CAN BE EXPECTED TO HOLD THE LINE, ESPECIALLY SINCE IVORY COAST WILL. FROM TALKING WITH AMBASSADORS EASUM AND BLACK, I STILL BELIEVE IT CAN BE USEFUL TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH NIGERIA AND GHANA. SMITH UNQUOTE INGERSOLL

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